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After Personalism: Power Transfer Dynamics at the End of First Presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Comparative Politics
Elites
Power
Luca Anceschi
University of Glasgow
Luca Anceschi
University of Glasgow

Abstract

Personalistic leadership demarcated quite precisely the contours of Central Asia’s authoritarian evolution throughout the post-Soviet era. The region witnessed the consolidation of personalistic rule in both Turkmenistan, under S.A. Niyazov [1992-2006], and Uzbekistan throughout the long presidency of I.A. Karimov [1992-2016]. In line with mainstream inquiries of personalist autocracies emerged elsewhere, the scholarly scrutiny of Central Asian personalism has predominantly focused on the factors that led to the emergence and eventual crystallisation of such regimes, the institutional settings in which they prospered, while examining the complex web of informal relationships that enabled regime personalisation across the region. Not much scholarly attention has been centred to date on the power transfer processes set into motion by the deaths of the first presidents who led personalist regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This problem defines the empirical core of the present paper, which pursues in this sense a specific analytical end: identifying the mechanisms through which an élite collective—a selectorate, in other words—shaped succession dynamics within a regime sustained by the influence of an individual political actor. To illuminate upon these dynamics, the paper begins its investigation by looking comparatively at the power transfer processes occurred in Turkmenistan in 2006/7 and Uzbekistan in late 2016, identifying patterns of collective decision-making that borrowed extensively from the Soviet authoritarian playbook. The paper then shifts its attention onto the 79 élite members forming these two selectorates involved in post-personalist power transfers, showcasing the results of a quantitative analysis of these cadres’ biographies and career trajectories. By delving into leader-élite relations as emerged in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan at the conclusion of first presidencies, the paper intends to discuss whether cadre management strategies consolidated under personalism survived the departure of the leaders who were responsible for their initial formulation and managed their protracted implementation.