Judicial Selection and Partisan Decision-Making

Abstract

This panel seeks to address the impact of judicial selection models on the composition of courts and judicial panels and on their decision-making. It analyses 1) differences in decision-making by individual judges with different backgrounds (such as gender) and 2) partisan policies and proximity of judges' preferences to politicians based on a particular judicial selection models. What are the patterns of composition in various judiciaries? Are there systemic differences between the decisions of judges with different backgrounds? Does the ideological closeness of judicial selection bodies and judges translate into courts' decision-making? Does the effect of diversity vary between different areas of law?

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